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This paper focuses on the impact of founder transitions in initial public offering firms. We 
examine transitions where the founder remains as CEO, stays in the top management team or on 
the board of directors, or is not in the firm anymore. We then test the model using 210 IPO firms 
with SIC codes in the range 7000-8999 that went public between 2000 and 2012. As robustness 
test, we divide the sample into IPO listings from 2000-05 and 2006-12, and differentiate between 
laddering vs. non-laddering related litigation, lawsuits for accounting reasons vs. non-accounting 
reasons, and dismissed vs. non-dismissed cases. The results suggest that firms tend to obtain 
higher valuations when they have professional managers. After three years, however, having the 
founder remain as CEO will be associated with a higher failure rate compared to having the 
founder leave the firm. In addition, within three years after the IPO, when a founder moves to a 
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1. Introduction 
It is common knowledge that the founder plays a very important role in any firm. However, a lot 
of firms choose to let the founder step back and find a professional manager to become the CEO 
before the initial public offering. This seems reasonable, considering that founders are said to 
lack the necessary education and experience (Daily & Dalton, 1992). Shirokova and Knatko 
(2008) suggest that founders may not have the skills required for the further development of the 
organization, and the entrepreneur may well retire from the CEO position. Founders may not be 
as appropriate as leaders as was once thought, especially for an IPO firm, which needs to appeal 
to investors. Despite this, there are some very successful firms whose founders remained as CEO 
after the IPO such as Bill Gates of Microsoft, Steve Jobs of Apple, and Travis Kalanick of Uber. 
It is also true that a founder does not have to leave the firm just because they are not the CEO; 
some firms may provide them with another position in the top management team, or let them 
remain as chairman of the board prior to the IPO, because they believe that the founder has some 
knowledge and technical skills that are very important to the firm. This paper answers the 
following questions: Does founder transition have an impact on IPO valuation? If so, is it a 
positive impact? After the IPO, would founder transition continue to affect the firm’s 
performance, such as the likelihood of being delisted from SEC or Exchange and the possibility 
of being sued?  
 
This research brings together 210 IPO firms in the service industry that issued shares on 
NASDAQ Exchange between 2000 and 2012. There are 108 IPO firms from 2000-05, and 102 
firms from 2006-12. We focus our analysis on firms from the service industry classification, as 
examining a single industry can eliminate cross-industry effects. All the firms included in this 
sample are from SIC codes 7000-8999 (Services Industry). Among the 210 firms in the 2000-12 
IPO sample, we identify 42 firms that were sued in connection with their IPOs. We divide these 
42 lawsuits into 11 laddering and 31 non-laddering lawsuits, 20 accounting reason and 22 
non-accounting reason lawsuits, and 13 dismissed and 29 non-dismissed lawsuits. 
 
The main objective of this paper is to examine how founder transition affects IPO valuation, IPO 
firm delisting, and IPO firm litigation. Several researches have studied whether having the 
founder or professional manger as the CEO could enhance IPO valuation, but there has been 
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little research on founders who moved to the top management team or the board. This paper 
classifies founder transitions into three types: the firm is managed by a non-founder CEO and the 
founder is no longer related to the firm in any position; the original founder CEO stays in the 
firm and moves to a non-CEO position in the top management team; and the former founder 
CEO stays in the firm and becomes a member of the board, but is not in the top management 
team and is no longer a CEO. According to Kim et al (2004), in the three years after going public, 
firms tend to significantly underperform. Therefore, we chose a three-year period to see whether 
firms were delisted from NASDAQ Exchange due to not meeting requirements, being acquired 
by another firm at a stock price that was 75% or more below its IPO price within three years 
after the IPO, or being sued within three years after the IPO. There are some other factors that 
may also affect the IPO valuation or likelihood of delisting and litigation, such as the firm’s age, 
size, auditor reputation, underwriter rank, net income one year before the IPO, the percentage 
return of the NASDAQ index, and the CEO’s prior industry experience. 
 
According to Certo et al. (2001), founder-led firms are more likely to have an underpriced IPO 
than professionally managed firms. Martens et al. (2005) finds that replacing the founder-CEO 
with a professional lead to an increased IPO price. Therefore, for the hypothesis, we assumed 
that replacing the founder-CEO with a non-founder-CEO before the IPO would lead to a higher 
IPO valuation than if the founder was retained as CEO, with the same result if the founder 
moved to the top management team or the board. In terms of the likelihood of delisting and being 
sued, we hypothesized that this would be lower if the founder either left the company or took 
another position in the top management team or board than if they stayed on as CEO. 
 
Next, we apply OLS regression to examine whether founder transition has an impact on IPO 
valuation, and used logistic regression to test whether founder transition would affect the 
likelihood of delisting and being sued within three years after the IPO, testing the subsamples 
mentioned above separately for reasons of robustness. 
 
The results show that, controlling for other factors, replacing the founder-CEO with a 
non-founder-CEO before the IPO tends to lead to a higher IPO valuation and lower delisting rate 
within three years after the IPO, compared to retaining the founder as CEO. In addition, having 
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the founder take a non-CEO role in the top management team is related to a lower chance of 
delisting, and a lower likelihood of being sued, for firms within three years post-IPO, compared 
to retaining the founder as CEO. Restricting the founder to the board is also associated with a 
reduced risk of firms being sued within three years post-IPO, compared to having the founder 
remain as CEO.  
 
For other control factors, we find the following relationships with the target variables. The 
percentage return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 days before the IPO is positively related 
to the firm’s IPO valuation. The firm’s size is positively related to its IPO valuation and 
negatively related to its risk of being delisted. While the result of firm’s age is actually opposed 
to its size, it is negatively related to its IPO valuation and positively related to its likelihood of 
being delisted. Both underwriter rank and auditor reputation are negatively related to the chance 
of delisting, which is quite reasonable. 
 
To summarize, in this study, we examine the impact of founder transition on the IPO valuation 
and the likelihood of a firm being delisting and sued in the long term. In the process, this paper 
contributes to the existing research in several ways. One issue is that previous studies which 
examined the founder-CEOs and professional CEOs in IPO firms did not specify whether the 
founder had left the firm, moved to the top management team, or took a position on the board 
when they were replaced by a professional CEO. Our empirical setup closely follows that 
employed by Martens et al. (2005). However, we expand their analysis by testing how the 
presence of founders affects a firm’s delisting rate and litigation risk. In addition, we categorize 
lawsuits into several groups: laddering vs. non-laddering-related litigation, lawsuits filed in 
connection with accounting fraud vs. non-accounting lawsuits, and dismissed vs. non-dismissed 
cases.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature; Section 3 
develops the underlying hypotheses; Section 4 defines the variables and details the methodology. 
Section 5 describes the sample data and reports the empirical results. Section 6 presents the 
robustness test approach and results; finally, Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review  
Many papers have investigated the relationship between having a founder-CEO and a firm’s 
stock market performance. While there is evidence suggesting that founder-CEOs are more 
likely than professional CEOs to have an underpriced IPO, there is no agreement on how 
founder-CEOs should be replaced, and there is not enough evidence about the impact of founder 
transitions on the long-term performance of IPO firms; for instance, in terms of the possibility of 
being delisted and the likelihood of facing litigation. 
 
2.1 Studies on founder-CEOs 
In some articles, founder-CEOs are seen in a negative light. For example, Bennedsen et al. (2006) 
find that family-CEO underperformance is particularly large in fast-growing industries, 
industries with highly skilled labor force, and relatively large firms. Daily and Dalton (1992) 
suggest that founders may lack the knowledge and experience of professional managerial 
assistants. Although founders may be unable to effectively manage a growing firm on a 
day-to-day basis, they can remain on the board of directors and thereby retain some critical 
control. Shirokova and Knatko (2008) indicate that founders may not have the skills required for 
the further development of the organization, and the entrepreneur may well retire from the CEO 
position. In addition, middle managers tend to be mediocre because they know they have little 
opportunity for advancement; as a result, they have an adverse impact on the company’s growth. 
Certo et al. (2001) note that founder-led firms are more likely to have an underpriced IPO than 
professionally managed firms. Martens et al. (2005) find that replacing the founder-CEO with a 
professional resulted in an increase of, on average, $12 million in the valuation of an initial 
public offering on a U.S. stock exchange between 1996 and 2000. 
 
In contrast, some other papers yielded empirical results that did not support replacing the founder 
before the firm’s IPO, taking into account both short- and long-term performance. Fahlenbrach 
(2009) discovers that founder-CEO firms invest more in research and development, have higher 
capital expenditures, and make more sharply focused mergers and acquisitions. According to his 
findings, founder-CEO firms not only have a higher firm valuation than non-founder-CEO firms, 
but also have a higher subsequent stock market performance. One possible explanation for this is 
that, during the 1990s, founder-CEOs successfully embraced an expanded investment 
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opportunity set. Certo et al. (2001) and Nelson (2003) indicate that one-third to one-half of IPO 
firms go public with founder CEOs, and that founder-led firms tend to receive higher valuations 
at their IPO than non-founder-led firms. 
 
2.2 Studies on IPO valuation 
Some researchers have noted that retaining the founder as CEO could lead to a higher IPO 
valuation. For example, Jayraman et al. (2000) suggest that a willingness to undertake risks and a 
high desire for achievement are founder-typical characteristics that one might expect to generate 
and sustain superior performance over time. Bruton et al. (2010) argue that founders’ retained 
share ownership signals their private information on the higher quality of their IPO firms and this 
positively affects IPO value. Also, Bains (2007) indicates that early removal of the founding is 
correlated with poorer performance than retaining the founding team’s skills. 
 
Others have postulated that replacing the founder with an outsider as CEO can increase the 
firm’s value at the time of the IPO. Certo et al. (2001) and Nelson (2003) indicate that this is an 
expensive move that may send a signal to investors that reduces their uncertainty about the 
firm’s value, leading to a higher IPO price. Certo et al. (2001) also find that investment bankers 
are more likely to regard founder CEOs as optimistically biased and relatively unreceptive to 
information that fails to confirm their beliefs. If investment bankers associate increased 
uncertainty with firm founders, they are likely to set lower prices for IPO firms with founder as 
their CEOs than for those firms with non-founder CEOs. 
 
In addition, Jain and Tabak (2008) indicate that venture capital participation reduces the 
probability of having a founder CEO at IPO. Because strategic leadership skills are more highly 
valued than operational skills by VCs (venture capitalists), when founders are perceived not to 
have such skills, VCs often persuade the founder CEO to step down before the IPO in favour of 
professionals with the strategic leadership skills, education background, and experience to 
manage the IPO process and lead the firm forward as a public company. 
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2.3 Studies on IPO firm delisting 
Despite the growing literature on founder transitions, there have not been many empirical results 
on whether such transitions have an impact on firms’ delisting rates after the IPO. According to 
Kim et al. (2004), a large proportion of IPO firms survive for the first year following the IPO but 
delist by the end of the third year. The source also states that most NASDAQ delistings are due 
to firms failing to meet the minimum capital requirements for continued listing.  
 
In the CRSP database, delisting codes contain many classifications: active, mergers, exchanges, 
liquidations, dropped, expirations, and domestics that became foreign. Young et al. (2008) note 
that not all delistings represent failure. Delisting due to inability to meet listing exchange 
requirements (codes 500 to 599) is referred to as a failure, but delistings due to mergers and 
acquisitions (M & As) (codes 200 to 299) represent a grey area. Some managers may force 
M&As to obtain private benefits. Fama and French (2004) also argue that low-quality IPO firms 
are more likely to merge. However, Zingales (1995) believes that the IPO may be the first step in 
a gradual sale of the company, and subsequent acquisition may not indicate failure. 
 
Thus, voluntary delisting or an acquisition by another firm may or may not be defined as a 
failure, especially if the firm is acquired at a price above its IPO valuation. When a firm is 
delisted for failing to meet the exchange requirements or is acquired by another firm at a stock 
price that was 75% or more below its IPO price within three years after the IPO, we consider it 
as a delisting failure. 
 
2.4 Studies on IPO firm litigation 
Although a large amount of research focuses on IPO firm litigations, there have not been many 
studies on whether founder transitions have an impact on the litigation risk for firms after the 
IPO. According to Lowry and Shu (2002), the potential costs of litigation are substantial for a 
firm that is planning to go public, and one of the most highly publicized costs of litigation is the 
settlement payment, which averages $3.3 million in their sample and represents 11% of the total 
proceeds raised. There are other potential costs of lawsuits such as blows to the reputation of 
both the IPO firm and its managers, legal fees, and the loss of opportunity from the time 
dedicated to the lawsuit. Therefore, when a firm faces a securities class action lawsuit under 
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Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act within three years of their IPO, we consider this a litigation 
failure. 
 
When a company goes public, its founders or professional managers may confront a series of 
pressures over meeting investors’ high expectations. There is probably a difference between 
professional managers and founders in terms of their attitudes and resolutions in facing these 
pressures. Professional managers, especially salary-based CEOs, would rise to the challenge by 
leveraging their prior experience and excellent education and knowledge. Meanwhile, founder 
CEOs, who consider that stock price is associated with their wealth, may be tempted to engage in 
manipulative or fraudulent activities, especially if they lack education and experience. 
 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) indicate that the probability of restatement is significantly higher in 
companies in which the CEO belongs to the founding family. In addition, Emend et al. (2007) 
find that the likelihood of a mis-stated financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has 
extremely sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. Johnson et al. (2009) note that firm 
founders have high levels of risk tolerance and aggressiveness, which could arguably increase 
their likelihood of committing fraud. Finally, according to Agrawal and Cooper (2010), a 
founder CEO could use his influence to limit monitoring from independent directors, leading to a 
higher rate of manipulation and, consequently, a greater chance of their IPO firm being sued. 
 
Overall, there have been extensive studies on IPO valuation, firm delisting, and firm litigation. 
However, few have combined these factors with founder transitions to examine whether there is 
a relationship between them. 
 
3. Hypothesis 
3.1 Impact of founder transition on IPO valuation  
Some researchers have argued that a remaining founder as CEO has a positive impact on IPO 
firms; for instance, Mousa and Wales (2012) conclude that firms with founder CEOs are more 
likely to value and implement an entrepreneurial orientation thus increases post-IPO survival. 
Meanwhile, Certo et al. (2007) note that when founder CEOs retain higher levels of equity these 
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serve as valuable signals and such signals help reduce uncertainty and skepticism regarding an 
IPO firm’s performance prospects. 
 
Conversely, other papers have indicated that the departure of a founder is a good move for a 
company. According to Boeker and Karichalil (2002) firms with low founder ownership and fast 
growth tend to replace their founders. Additionally, Sanders and Boivie (2004) find that when 
founder-managers hold significant equity stakes in the IPO firm, there is a greater potential for 
these individuals to abuse public market investors.  	
Martens et al. (2005) find that replacing a founder-CEO with a professional could lead to an 
increased valuation at IPO. Certo et al. (2001), similarly, note that founder-led firms are more 
likely to have an underpriced IPO than professionally managed firms. 
 
All the studies mentioned above assume that once the founder is replaced as CEO, they will 
leave the company. However, this is not necessarily the case. Founders can still play a key role 
by taking another position in the top management team, or staying on as a director or even 
chairman of the board. Some firms believe that the founder possesses knowledge and technical 
skills that are very important, leading them to offer the founder a position in the top management 
team. Some may keep the founder on the board due to his vision and knowledge. Accordingly, 
this paper classifies founder transitions into three types: founder leaves the firm, founder stays on 
in a non-CEO role in the top management team, and founder only stays on the board. 
 
Based on the previous empirical results, the first three hypotheses to be tested in this paper are as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Replacing a founder CEO with a non-founder CEO before the IPO will lead to a 
higher IPO valuation. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Retaining the founder in a non-CEO role in the top management team will be 
related to a higher IPO valuation, compared to retaining the founder as CEO. 
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Hypothesis 3: Restricting the founder to a position on the board will be associated with a higher 
IPO valuation than if the founder is retained as CEO. 
 
3.2 Impact of founder transition on likelihood of IPO firm delisting 
According to Bradley et al. (2006), over the three-year period following the IPO, penny stock 
IPOs have a significant higher percentage of firms that delist for liquidation or poor performance. 
Yung et al. (2008) note that a lot of firms going public during waves will become worthless and 
the most natural empirical proxy for worthlessness is bankruptcy or delisting. Ang et al. (2007) 
indicate that while the majority of IPOs survive their first year, 39% of IPOs delist within five 
years. Bloomfield and Cho (2011) believe that firms may have delisted simply because the CEO 
chose to delist. Therefore, CEO characteristics plays key role in a delisting process. As 
mentioned before, founder CEOs seem to have a bad reputation, therefore, retaining the founder 
as CEO may has a bad impact on the company’s performance.  
 
We also mentioned that, when a firm is delisted for failing to meet the exchange requirements or 
is acquired by another firm at a stock price 75% or more below its IPO price within three years 
after the IPO, we consider it a delisting failure. With the bad performance of founder CEOs, 
there is a possibility that founder transition could be associated with the likelihood of an IPO 
firm incurring a delisting failure. 
 
Based on the literature and analysis above, the following hypotheses have been formed: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Replacing the founder-CEO with a non-founder-CEO before the IPO will lead to a 
lower delisting failure rate for firms within three years post-IPO, compared to retaining the 
founder as CEO. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Having the founder take a non-CEO role in the top management team will be 
related to a lower delisting failure rate for firms within three years post-IPO, compared to 
retaining the founder as CEO. 
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Hypothesis 6: Having the founder only on the board will be associated with a lower delisting 
failure rate for firms within three years post-IPO, compared to retaining the founder as CEO. 
 
3.3 Impact of founder transition on likelihood of IPO firm litigation 
Once a firm has an IPO, founders or professional managers may be under a lot of pressure to 
satisfy the high expectations of investors. Founder-CEOs really care about the stock price, 
because it is literally related to their wealth. As stated above, Johnson et al. (2009) note that firm 
founders have high levels of risk tolerance and aggressiveness, which could increase the 
likelihood of committing fraud. When facing high pressures, founder-CEOs tend to engage in 
manipulative or fraudulent actions, especially those without education and prior experience of 
managing IPO firms. It seems reasonable that replacing the founder-CEO with a 
non-founder-CEO could lead to a lower likelihood of being sued. 
 
In addition, as we mentioned before, founder transitions have three classifications. The founder 
does not have to leave the company; we assume that the likelihood of being sued would decrease 
when a founder becomes a non-CEO member in the top management team or on the board.  
 
Based on the research analysis above, the following hypotheses are presented: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Replacing the founder-CEO with a non-founder-CEO before the IPO will lead to a 
lower likelihood of a firm being sued within three years post-IPO, compared to retaining the 
founder as CEO. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Having the founder take a non-CEO role in the top management team will be 
related to a lower likelihood of a firm being sued within three years post-IPO, compared to 
retaining the founder as CEO. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Having the founder only on the board will be associated with a lower likelihood of 
a firm being sued within three years post-IPO, compared to retaining the founder as CEO. 
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3.4 Other influential factors 
We hypothesize that the IPO valuation, firm delisting failure rate, and the likelihood of being 
sued also depends on the following factors: 
 
Firm age 
According to Loderer and Waelchli (2011), there is an apparent worsening of corporate 
governance and performance in older firms. Therefore, we assume that firm age is negatively 
related to IPO valuation and positively related to the likelihood of being delisted and sued. 
 
Firm size 
Gu (2003) notes that, in general, firm size has a positive impact on IPO performance. 
Accordingly, we assume that firm size is positively associated with IPO valuation and negatively 
associated with the likelihood of being delisted and sued. 
 
Auditor reputation 
Bing (2009) indicates that there is a significant negative correlation between auditor reputation 
and stock underpricing, which implies that auditor reputation has a positive impact on IPO 
valuation. This leads us to assume that auditor reputation has a negative impact on the possibility 
of being delisted and sued. 
 
Underwriter rank 
Kirkulak and Davis (2005) conclude that the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing reflects the level of demand for the issue. Therefore, we assume that underwriter 
rank is positively related to IPO valuation and negatively related to the chance of being delisted 
and sued. 
 
Positive net income 
Ducharme et al. (2001) determine that pre-IPO abnormal accruals are positively related to initial 
firm value. Based on this, we assume that if a firm reports a positive net income in the year 




NASDAQ 30-day return  
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) suggest that momentum effects have an influence on IPO 
performance, since the percentage return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 calendar days 
before the IPO represents the market value. As a result, we assume that the NASDAQ 30-day 
return has a positive influence on IPO valuation and a negative impact on the likelihood of being 
delisted and sued. 
 
Prior industry experience 
Daily et al. (2005) show that the prior experience of CEOs leads to high IPO management 
quality. We therefore assume that if the CEO has excellent management experience in the same 
industry as the issuing firm, the firm tends to have a higher IPO valuation and a reduced chance 
of being delisted and sued. 
 
4.Data and Methodology 
4.1 Sample selection 
We collect 210 IPO firms in the service industry that issued shares on the NASDAQ Exchange 
between 2000 and 2012. There are 108 IPO firms from 2000-05 and 102 from 2006-12. We have 
focused on firms from the service industry classification, as using a single industry can eliminate 
cross-industry effects that may distort the results. All the firms included in this sample are from 
SIC codes 7000-8999 (Service Industry). We select our sample firms based on the information 
provided in prospectuses filed with the Securities Exchange Commission, which are available 
through the SEC’s EDGAR database (S-1 filing). We collect delisting information from the 
CRSP database. In addition, we reference Stanford University’s Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu) to identify firms that faced a securities class action 
lawsuit under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act within three years of their IPO. From the 210 
firms in the 2000-12 IPO sample, we identify 42 that were sued in connection with their IPOs. 
As mentioned earlier, we divide these 42 lawsuits into 11 laddering and 31 non-laddering 




4.2 Dependent variables 
We used three dependent variables in this study. First, there is the amount of capital raised 
through the IPO (number of shares * offering price). This amount is the valuation of the IPO and 
represents the key resource acquired by the IPO firm in the process, and is therefore a good 
measurement of short-term performance. As the data was left-skewed, we use a natural 
logarithmic function for the calculation. Second, we analyze the long-term performance of the 
IPO firms using a variable that represents delisting failure from the NASDAQ Exchange within 
three years after the IPO date. The reason we choose a three-year period is because Kim et al. 
(2004) find that return on assets 3 years after the IPO is 70% lower than during the year before 
the IPO and that company performance data are required to report up to 3 years of financial 
performance. When firms fail to meet SEC or stock exchange requirements, or when they 
voluntarily remove themselves from the stock exchange because they or their management 
purchase the outstanding shares, or when they are acquired by anther company, they may be 
delisted. However, if the firm is delisted voluntarily or acquired at a price above its IPO 
valuation, we may not consider it as a “delisting failure”. Therefore, we identify the variable 
delisting as “1” if it is delisted for failing to achieve SEC or stock exchange requirements or is 
acquired by another firm at a price which is 75% or more below its IPO valuation; otherwise, as 
“0”. Finally, we define the variable litigation as “1” if the firm face a securities class action 
lawsuit under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act within three years of their IPO; otherwise, as 
“0”. This is because, as a public company, facing a lawsuit entails high cost and loss of time, 
which represents a “failure” in long-term performance. We test the hypothesis on the IPO 
valuation using OLS regression analysis, and use logistic regression for the three-year delisting 
analysis and three-year lawsuit analysis. 
 
4.3 Independent variables 
In this study, the primary independent variable is the status of the firm’s original founder-CEO. 
The founder-leave variable is a dummy variable, where “1” denotes that the firm is managed by 
a non-founder-CEO and that the founder is no longer associated with the firm in any way. We 
identify the founder-top variable as a dichotomous measure, whereby “1” means that the original 
founder-CEO stays in the firm and assumes a non-CEO position in the top management team. 
We define the founder-board variable as a dummy variable，whereby “1” indicates that the 
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former-founder CEO stays with the firm and becomes a member of the board, but is not in the 
top management team and is no longer a CEO. In all these cases, the comparison case is where 
the original founder CEO remains as the CEO. 
 
4.4 Control variables 
To account for possible impacts on IPO valuation and firm performance, this study uses a 
number of control variables. First, there are some control variables for firms which we believe 
have an influence on IPO and firm performance. We control for firm age from the date of 
incorporation to the date of IPO, since Clark (2002) indicates that excess returns are positively 
associated with logged age at IPO at a statistically significant level. We also consider Ln 
(employees) has an impact on valuations and performance. Since the sample firms are only in the 
service industry, we use the number of employees as a measure of firm size and then compute 
the natural log of the number of employees at the time of IPO, due to the skewedness of the data. 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2006) find that auditor reputation and independence have a material impact 
on the credibility and audit quality of audited financial statements and the market factors this into 
the prices of firm shares. Therefore, we control auditor reputation as a dichotomous variable, 
wherein “1” represents that the auditing firm is one of the Big 4 audit firms; otherwise, the value 
is “0” (non-Big 4). Loughran and Ritter (2004) rank the underwriter prestige values from 0-9; we 
control underwriter rank using this method. This study also includes a dummy variable, net 
positive income, which is a measure of profitability wherein “1” indicates a firm that reports a 
net profit in the year before the IPO, otherwise, the value is “0”. Second, there is a market-level 
control variable, NASDAQ 30-days return. Since we collect all the sample IPOs from the 
NASDAQ Exchange, we control the NASDAQ market performance in the 30 days prior to the 
IPO and measure it as a percentage return on the NASDAQ index during this period. Finally, 
Yang et al. (2011) indicate that a CEO’s characteristics, such as prior executive experience, are 
significantly related to their IPO performance. Therefore, we use a dichotomous variable for 
CEOs, prior industry experience, whereby “1” represents that the CEO has management 
experience in other firms in the same industry as the IPO firm; otherwise, the value is “0”. 
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4.5 Regression model 
This paper tests the impact of founder transitions on IPO valuations using OLS regressions. In 
model 1, we examine how IPO valuations were influenced by the control variables. In model 2, 
we incorporate the three founder variables. Below are the two models: 
Model 1:  ln #$%	'()*+ ∗ -..+(	/0-1234= 6 + 89 ∗ .)(0	/:+ + 8; ∗ 2/4</=	30	</@	(+31(2 + 8A ∗ ln +0'B-@++4+ 8C ∗ /1<)3-(	(+'13/3)-2 + 8D ∗ 12<+(E()3+(	(/2F + 8G∗ '-4)3)H+	2+3	)2*-0+ + 8I ∗ '()-(	)2<143(@	+J'+()+2*+ 
 
Model 2: ln #$%	'()*+ ∗ -..+(	/0-1234= 6 + 89 ∗ .-12<+( − B+/H+ + 8; ∗ .-12<+( − 3-' + 8A ∗ .-12<+( − L-/(<+ 8C ∗ .)(0	/:+ + 8D ∗ 2/4</=	30	</@	(+31(2 + 8G ∗ ln +0'B-@++4 + 8I∗ /1<)3-(	(+'13/3)-2 + 8M ∗ 12<+(E()3+(	(/2F + 8N ∗ '-4)3)H+	2+3	)2*-0++ 89O ∗ '()-(	)2<143(@	+J'+()+2*+ 
 
We also examine the influence of founder transitions on three-year delisting failures of IPO firms 
using logistic regressions. In model 3, we examine how delisting failures are affected by the 
control variables. In model 4, we incorporate the three founder variables. Below are the two 
models:  
Model 3: <+B)43)2: = 6 + 89 ∗ .)(0	/:+ + 8; ∗ 2/4</=	30	</@	(+31(2 + 8A ∗ ln +0'B-@++4 + 8C∗ /1<)3-(	(+'13/3)-2 + 8D ∗ 12<+(E()3+(	(/2F + 8G ∗ '-4)3)H+	2+3	)2*-0++ 8I ∗ '()-(	)2<143(@	+J'+()+2*+ 
 
Model 4: delisting = 6 + 89 ∗ .-12<+( − B+/H+ + 8; ∗ .-12<+( − 3-' + 8A ∗ .-12<+( − L-/(< + 8C∗ .)(0	/:+ + 8D ∗ 2/4</=	30	</@	(+31(2 + 8G ∗ ln +0'B-@++4 + 8I∗ /1<)3-(	(+'13/3)-2 + 8M ∗ 12<+(E()3+(	(/2F + 8N ∗ '-4)3)H+	2+3	)2*-0++ 89O ∗ '()-(	)2<143(@	+J'+()+2*+ 
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We then test the impact of founder transitions on the occurrence of litigation within three years 
after the IPO, using logistic regressions. In model 5, we examine how the possibility of litigation 
is influenced by the control variables; in model 6, we incorporate the three founder variables. 
The two models are presented below: 
Model 5: B)3):/3)-2 = 6 + 89 ∗ .)(0	/:+ + 8; ∗ 2/4</=	30	</@	(+31(2 + 8A ∗ ln +0'B-@++4 + 8C∗ /1<)3-(	(+'13/3)-2 + 8D ∗ 12<+(E()3+(	(/2F + 8G ∗ '-4)3)H+	2+3	)2*-0++ 8I ∗ '()-(	)2<143(@	+J'+()+2*+ 
 
Model 6: litigation = 6 + 89 ∗ .-12<+( − B+/H+ + 8; ∗ .-12<+( − 3-' + 8A ∗ .-12<+( − L-/(< + 8C∗ .)(0	/:+ + 8D ∗ 2/4</=	30	</@	(+31(2 + 8G ∗ ln +0'B-@++4 + 8I∗ /1<)3-(	(+'13/3)-2 + 8M ∗ 12<+(E()3+(	(/2F + 8N ∗ '-4)3)H+	2+3	)2*-0++ 89O ∗ '()-(	)2<143(@	+J'+()+2*+ 
 
5.Results 
5.1 Data description 
As stated, the sample consists of 210 IPO firms in the service industry that went public on the 
NASDAQ Exchange between 2000 and 2012. Table 1 shows that the average firm age is 11.11 
years, the average number of employees is 1553, and the average IPO valuation is $197.27 
million. In the long run, the IPOs in the sample have a three-year delisting failure rate of 10.48% 
and a three-year litigation rate of 20%. 
 
Table 2 presents the distribution of all IPOs, as well as the subsample of sued IPOs across the 
years. This demonstrates that the IPO volume is highest in 2000 with 43 IPOs, and hit its lowest 
level in 2003 and 2008 with 7 IPOs separately. There are also 12 IPO firms that went public in 
2000 that were subsequently sued. 
 
Table 3 provides more detailed information regarding the lawsuits filed against the sample firms. 
Panel A describes the nature of the primary alleged fraud in each complaint. The majority of 
suits alleged “misleading or false statements”; it seems that in 2001/2002, there was a wave of 
IPO laddering litigations. A large proportion of all sued firms were accused of misrepresenting 
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their financial condition, engaging in improper earnings recognition, using inappropriate 
accounting practices or violating GAAP standards, or overstating their financial performance. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 gives details of the outcome of the sample lawsuits. 24 of the 42 lawsuits in 
the sample were settled, 13 were dismissed, and 5 are still pending as of March 2016. 
 
5.2 Regression results for IPO valuation 
Using the OLS regression to examine the effect on IPO valuation, Table 4 shows a positive and 
significant coefficient for the founder-leave variable and suggests that replacing a founder-CEO 
with a non-founder-CEO before the IPO will lead to a higher IPO valuation compared to 
retaining the founder as CEO, controlling for other factors. This result is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. We do not observe the significance of the variables founder-top and 
founder-board, which means that there is no significant correlation with the IPO valuation, 
whether the founder moves to the top management team as a non-CEO member or gravitates to 
the board. Therefore, we do not find support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
 
From Table 4, we can also find that there is a significant and positive coefficient for the variables 
ln (employees), underwriter rank, and positive net income. We conclude that the firm size, the 
underwriter reputation, and the net profit in the year before the IPO are significantly positive 
when related to the firm’s IPO valuation. These results are consistent with the hypotheses. In 
addition, the coefficient of the variable firm size is significantly negative, which means that the 
younger the firm, the higher the IPO valuation. 
 
5.3 Logistic regression results for IPO firm delisting  
Using the logistics regression to examine the effect on the delisting failure, Table 5 shows a 
negative and significant coefficient for the founder-leave variable and suggests that keeping the 
founder as CEO is associated with a higher delisting failure rate, compared to having the founder 
leave the firm. In addition, the negative and significant coefficient for the founder-top variable 
suggests that having the founder remain as a non-CEO member of the top management team is 
associated with a lower delisting failure rate, compared to having the founder remain as CEO. 
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These conclusions are consistent with Hypotheses 4 and 5. We do not find significance for the 
variable founder-board, which means that merely having the founder serve on the board is not 
significantly different from retaining the founder as CEO. Therefore, there is no support for 
Hypothesis 6. 
 
In Table 5, we can see a significant and positive coefficient for the following variables: firm age, 
and underwriter rank. We can conclude that the younger the firm, the lower the IPO firm 
delisting rate. The smaller the underwriter reputation, the lower the IPO firm delisting rate.  
 
5.4 Logistic regression results for IPO firm litigation  
Using the logistics regression to examine the effect on delisting failure, Table 6 provides the 
negative and significant coefficient for the founder-top variable and suggests that having the 
founder remain as a non-CEO member of the top management team is associated with a lower 
litigation rate than having the founder remain as CEO. The negative and significant coefficient 
for the founder-board variable further suggests that only having the founder on the board is 
associated with a lower litigation rate than if the founder remains as CEO. These results are 
consistent with Hypotheses 8 and 9. We do not observe a significant result for the founder-leave 
variable, so there is no evidence to support Hypothesis 7. 
 
6. Robustness Tests 
6.1 Regression results (sample 2000-05 vs. sample 2006-12) 
For the robustness tests, we divide the sample firms into two groups: 108 firms from 2000-05, 
and 102 from 2006-12, as mentioned earlier. We analyze the influences of founder transitions on 
IPO valuation, delisting failure rate, and litigation rate of firms within three years after the IPO 
by using the same models and testing these two groups separately.  
 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 show the respective subsample tests results. Despite no significant results for 
IPO valuation and litigation rate being found for sample 2006-12, most are similar to those for 
sample 2000-05. In addition, we do observe a significant positive relation between founder-top 
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variable and IPO valuation in sample 2000-05, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. In sample 
2006-12, founder-leave variable is significantly negative related to delisting failure rate, and in 
sample 2000-05, founder-top variable is significantly negative associated with delisting failure 
rate as well. 
 
6.2 Regression results (non-accounting-related fraud vs. accounting-related fraud) 
In Table 3, we can see that a significant portion of the lawsuits in the sample alleged that the 
companies had misleading or false statements, laid out over-optimistic forecasts, or failed to 
disclose existing business problems. Such claims are obviously different from cases that allege 
accounting fraud. However, we do not know whether the top executives intentionally hid 
problems and made over-optimistic forecasts, or were simply unable to grasp the business 
problems and were over-confident about their firm’s future. Therefore, we divide the sample of 
lawsuits into two groups: accounting-related and non-accounting-related. Among all 42 lawsuits, 
there are 20 accounting allegations and 22 non-accounting allegations, and we use 20 out of 188 
firms to run the logistic regression on accounting allegations and 20 out of 190 firms to run the 
logistic regression on non-accounting allegations. 
 
Table 10 reports the results of the respective subsample tests. We find that the variable 
founder-board is significantly negatively related to the possibility of facing accounting-related 
lawsuits for firms within three years after IPO. In addition, the variable founder-top is 
significantly negatively associated with the possibility of facing non-accounting-related cases for 
firms within three years after IPO. The results suggest that moving the founder to the board, 
rather than having them remain as CEO, tends to reduce the chance of accounting-related 
lawsuits, and that having the founder take a non-CEO role in the top management team could 
lower the possibility of non-accounting-related cases for firms within three years after IPO. 
 
6.3 Regression results (non-laddering lawsuits) 
From Table 3, it is clear that a large proportion of the lawsuits in the sample are laddering cases. 
In the 2001/02 wave of IPO laddering litigations, instead of the issuers, these IPOs’ underwriters 
were alleged to be the principal wrongdoers. However, compared to other allegation types, the 
laddering lawsuit has less to do with the IPO in terms of the firm, the founder, or the CEO. 
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Therefore, we exclude the sample of laddering schemes. Among all 42 lawsuits, there are 11 
laddering and 31 non-laddering lawsuits; we use 31 out of 199 firms to run the logistic 
regression. 
 
Table 11 tells us that the variable founder-board is significantly negatively related to the 
possibility of firms facing non-laddering lawsuits within three years after IPO, which means that 
having the founder on the board is associated with a lower non-laddering litigation rate compared 
to retaining the founder as CEO. 
 
6.4 Regression results (non-dismissed cases vs. dismissed cases) 
In panel B of Table 3, we can see that among all 42 cases, 13 were dismissed, 24 were settled 
and 5 are still pending. To further examine the impact of founder transitions on litigations after 
the IPO, we divide the sample of lawsuits into two groups: dismissed cases vs. non-dismissed 
cases. We run subsample tests by using 13 out of 181 firms to run the logistic regression on 
dismissed cases and 29 out of 197 firms to run the logistic regression on non-dismissed cases. 
 
Table 12 reports the result of the respective subsample tests. It suggests that the variable 
founder-top is significantly negatively related to the possibility of facing non-dismissed cases 
and that the variable founder-board is significantly negatively associated with the dismissed 
litigation rate. We can see that rather than retaining the founder as CEO, having the founder 
adopt a non-CEO role in the top management team tends to reduce the chance of facing 
non-dismissed cases, while moving the founder to the board could lead to a lower possibility of 
firms facing dismissed cases within three years after IPO. 
 
7.Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine whether founder transition has an impact on the following three 
aspects: IPO valuation, firm delisting rate within three years after IPO, and the likelihood of 
firms being sued within three years after IPO. 
 
Focusing on IPO firms in the service industry on the NASDAQ Exchange during the period 
2000-12, we collect 210 firms and divide them into two subsamples: 108 firms from 2000-05 and 
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102 from 2006-12. To be specific, we also explore the sued IPO firms, and divide them into 
subsamples such as accounting-related vs. non-accounting-related fraud, laddering vs. 
non-laddering cases, and dismissed vs. non-dismissed lawsuits. 
 
We then apply an analysis of OLS regression on the IPO valuation. We find that replacing a 
founder-CEO with a non-founder-CEO before the IPO leads to a higher IPO valuation than if the 
founder remains as CEO. Next, we run logistic regression on the delisting rate. The results 
confirm that both replacing a founder-CEO with a non-founder-CEO, and having the founder 
take a non-CEO role in the top management team before the IPO, leads to a lower delisting 
possibility within three years after IPO, compared to letting the founder remain as CEO. Finally, 
using logistic regression, we test the founder transition’s impact on the likelihood of being sued. 
We find that either having the founder assume a non-CEO role in the top management team, or 
moving them to the board, are associated with a lower likelihood of firms being sued within 
three years post-IPO, compared to retaining the founder as CEO.  
 
For the robustness test, despite finding no statistically significant results, most results for the 
2006-12 samples are similar to those for the 2000-05 sample. In addition, having the founder on 
the board rather than as CEO tends to reduce the chance of accounting-related lawsuits, 
non-laddering cases, and dismissed litigations for firms within three years after IPO. Having the 
founder take a non-CEO role in the top management team could lead to a lower risk of 
non-accounting-related cases and non-dismissed lawsuits within three years after IPO. 
 
Overall, the results from this paper indicate that replacing the founder-CEO with a 
non-founder-CEO before the IPO leads to a higher IPO valuation, compared to retaining the 
founder as CEO. In addition, as long as the founder is not retained as CEO, either by going to the 
top management team or by taking a position on the board, would lower the chance of their firm 
being delisted or sued within three years after IPO. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
This table summarizes the characteristics for the whole sample. The mean and median values for variable IPO 
valuation, firm age, number of employees, and underwriter rank are reported. The mean values of the 
dependent variables, delisting failure and litigation, indicate that the IPOs in the sample had a three-year 
delisting failure rate of 10.48% and a three-year litigation rate of 20% in the long run. 
 
 
 Panel A: Sample Selection 










Stanford University’s Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse 
(http://securities.stanford.edu) 
Number 




Panel B: Sample Characteristics         
 Founder-leave Founder-top Founder-board Total   
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median   
IPO valuation (million) $196.84 $78 $197.84 $77.95 $199.65 $77.95 $197.27 $78.72   
Firm age (year) 11.27 9 11.17 9 11.13 9 11.11 9   
Number of employees  1566.51 374 1575.33 369.5 1548.10 372 1553.39 372   
Underwriter rank (0-9) 7.90 9 7.92 9 7.92 9 7.93 9   
Delisting failure rate 10.73% 0 10.68% 0 10.68% 0 10.48% 0   
Litigation rate 20.49% 0 20.39% 0 20.39% 0 20% 0   
 












Table 2. Sample Distribution across Years 
The sample consists of 210 IPO firms that went public on the NASDAQ Exchange between 2000 and 2012 
and that are listed in the Securities Data Company (SDC) database in the service industry (SIC codes 7000 to 
8999). Sued firms are identified through Stanford University’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
(http://securities.stanford.edu) and the Securities Class Action Alert (SCAA). We consider lawsuits that were 
filed against the issuing firms within three years of their IPO date under Section 11 of the 1993 Securities Act. 
Laddering cases filed against the underwriters, in which issuers are named as co-defendants, are also included. 
Table 2 provides a summary of statistics on the number of IPOs and the proportion of sued IPO firms by year. 
 
Number of IPOs (2000-2012) 
IPO year No. of IPOs Number of IPOs sued under Section 11 % of IPOs sued under Section 11 
2000 43 12 27.91 
2001 13 3 23.08 
2002 14 2 14.29 
2003 7 0 0.00 
2004 16 1 6.25 
2005 15 4 26.67 
2006 18 3 16.67 
2007 11 4 36.36 
2008 7 1 14.29 
2009 14 2 14.29 
2010 18 4 22.22 
2011 19 5 26.32 
2012 15 1 6.67 










Table 3. Nature and Outcome of Lawsuits 
his table provides a summary of statistics for the IPO litigation sample. In Panel A, we identify the nature of 
lawsuits using the case summary for each lawsuit as provided by Stanford University’s Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse (SCAC) (http://securities.stanford.edu). Considering that some lawsuits involve multiple 
allegations, the number of allegations (51) exceeds the number of lawsuits (42) in the sample. Panel B 
provides information on the outcomes of these lawsuits as of February 2016. We search the SCAC, the 
Securities Class Action Alert (SCAA), and the Department of Justice Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records (PACER) (http:// www. pacer.gov) database to determine how each lawsuit was resolved. 
 
Panel A: Nature of Allegation 
Nature of legal claim Number of cases Percentage of total 
Laddering schemes 12 28.57 
Insider trading 2 4.76 
False or misleading statements made at IPO  3 7.14 
Improper accounting practices, violations of 
GAAP 1 2.38 
Improper revenue recognition + improper sales 
practices 3 7.14 
False (overoptimistic) forecasts 3 7.14 
False financial results (overstatement of 
financial performance) 4 9.52 
Failure to disclose existing business problems 3 7.14 
Misleading or false statements (general) 14 33.33 
False statements regarding business + 
operations  4 9.52 
Improper registration of securities with SEC + 
other “formalities” 2 4.76 
Total 51 121.43 
 
Panel B: Outcome of the lawsuits 







Table 4. OLS Regression Results for IPO Valuation 
This table presents the impacts of founder transition on IPO valuation. We calculate Ln (valuation) by 
computing a natural log of the raised capital amount, which is the number of shares multiplied by offering 
price. The founder-leave variable is a dummy variable, where “1” denotes that the firm is managed by a 
non-founder-CEO and that the founder is no longer associated with the firm in any way. We identify the 
founder-top variable as a dichotomous measure, where “1” means that the original founder-CEO stays in the 
firm and assumes a non-CEO position in the top management team. The founder-board variable is a dummy 
variable, where “1” indicates that the former founder-CEO stays with the firm and becomes a member of the 
board, but is not in the top management team and is no longer a CEO. We measure NASDAQ 30-days return 
as a percentage return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 days prior to the IPO. Ln (employees) is a measure 
of firm size, gained by calculating the natural log of the number of employees at the time of IPO. Auditor 
reputation is a dichotomous variable, where “1” represents that the auditing firm is one of the Big 4 audit firms 
and “0” is used for non-Big 4 firms. Underwriters are ranked from 0 to 9 by prestige values. Net positive 
income is a dummy variable and a measure of profitability, where “1” indicates a firm that reports a net profit 
in the year before the IPO; otherwise, the value is “0”. Prior industry experience is a dichotomous variable 
about CEO, where “1” represents that the CEO has management experience in other firms in the same industry 
as the IPO firm; otherwise, the value is “0”. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
OLS Regression 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Ln (Valuation) 
Model 1 ---- Controls Model 2 ----- Founder Status 
Parameter Estimate P Value Parameter Estimate P Value 
Intercept 15.36*** 0.0001 15.29*** 0.0001 
Firm age -0.01** 0.0133 -0.02*** 0.0022 
NASDAQ 30-day 
return 0.72 0.2516 0.49 0.4440 
Ln (employees) 0.42*** 0.0001 0.45*** 0.0001 
Auditor reputation 0.05 0.7046 0.06 0.6332 
Underwriter rank 0.25*** 0.0001 0.24*** 0.0001 
Positive net income 0.22** 0.0458 0.22** 0.0479 
Prior industry 
experience -0.21 0.5462 -0.18 0.6103 
Founder-leave   0.31* 0.0645 
Founder-top   0.09 0.5665 
Founder-board   -0.02 0.9025	
Adjusted R2 0.3353  0.3384  
F Value 16.06*** 0.0001 11.69*** 0.0001 
N=210 
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Results for IPO Firm Delisting 
This table presents the impacts of founder transition on IPO firm delisting. Delisting is a dummy variable that 
equals “1” if a firm is delisted for failing to achieve SEC or stock exchange requirements or being acquired by 
another firm at a price which was 75% or more below its IPO valuation; otherwise, “0” is used. The 
founder-leave variable is a dummy variable, where “1” denotes that the firm is managed by a 
non-founder-CEO and that the founder is no longer associated with the firm in any way. We identify the 
founder-top variable as a dichotomous measure, where “1” means that the original founder-CEO stays in the 
firm and assumes a non-CEO position in the top management team. The founder-board variable is a dummy 
variable, where “1” indicates that the former founder-CEO stays with the firm and becomes a member of the 
board, but is not in the top management team and is no longer a CEO. We measure NASDAQ 30-days return 
as a percentage return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 days prior to the IPO. Ln (employees) is a measure 
of firm size, gained by calculating the natural log of the number of employees at the time of IPO. Auditor 
reputation is a dichotomous variable, where “1” denotes that the auditing firm is one of the Big 4 audit firms; 
otherwise, “0” is used. Underwriters are ranked from 0 to 9 by prestige values. Net positive income is a 
dummy variable and a measure of profitability, where “1” indicates a firm that reports a net profit in the year 
before the IPO; otherwise, the value is “0”. Prior industry experience is a dichotomous variable for the CEO, 
where “1” represents that the CEO has management experience in other firms in the same industry as the IPO 
firm; otherwise, the value is “0”. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels. 
Logistic Regression 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Delisting 
Model 3 ---- Controls Model 4 ---- Founder Status 
Parameter Estimate P Value Parameter Estimate P Value 
Intercept 12.08 0.9812 13.72 0.9856 
Firm age 0.03 0.4007 0.08* 0.0545 
NASDAQ 30-day 
return -4.39 0.1625 -2.43 0.4688 
Ln (employees) -0.37 0.4154 -0.85 0.1142 
Auditor reputation -0.56 0.3903 -0.78 0.2662 
Underwriter rank 0.44*** 0.0028 0.58*** 0.0008 
Positive net income 0.53 0.2902 0.60 0.2752 
Prior industry 
experience -12.30 0.9809 -13.36 0.9859 
Founder-leave   -2.34*** 0.0022 
Founder-top   -1.39** 0.0339 
Founder-board   0.24 0.7842 
Chi2 Statistic 15.0001** 0.0360 28.0136*** 0.0018 






Table 6. Logistic Regression Results for IPO Firm Litigation  
This table presents the impacts of founder transition on IPO firm litigation. The variable litigation is “1” if the 
firm faces a securities class action lawsuit under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act within three years of 
their IPO; otherwise, the value is “0”. The founder-leave variable is a dummy variable, where “1” denotes that 
the firm is managed by a non-founder-CEO and that the founder is no longer associated with the firm in any 
way. I identified the founder-top variable as a dichotomous measure, where “1” means that the original 
founder-CEO stays in the firm and assumes a non-CEO position in the top management team. The 
founder-board variable is a dummy variable, where “1” indicates that the former founder-CEO stays with the 
firm and becomes a member of the board, but is not in the top management team and is no longer a CEO. We 
measure NASDAQ 30-days return as a percentage return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 days prior to 
the IPO. Ln (employees) is a measure of firm size formulated by calculating the natural log of the number of 
employees at the time of IPO. Auditor reputation is a dichotomous variable, where “1” represents that the 
auditing firm is one of the Big 4; “0” is used for non-Big 4 firms. Underwriters are ranked from 0 to 9 by 
prestige values. Net positive income is a dummy variable and a measure of profitability, wherein “1” indicates 
a firm that reported a net profit in the year before the IPO; otherwise, the value is “0”. Prior industry 
experience is a dichotomous variable regarding the CEO, where “1” denotes that the CEO has management 
experience in other firms in the same industry as the IPO firm; otherwise, the value is “0”. The symbols *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
                                                Logistic Regression 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Litigation 
Model 5 ---- Controls Model 6 ---- Founder Status 
Parameter Estimate P Value Parameter Estimate P Value 
Intercept 16.58 0.9808 17.43 0.9797 
Firm age 0.00 0.8542 0.01 0.5613 
NASDAQ 30-day 
return -1.58 0.4475 -1.53 0.4788 
Ln (employees) 0.01 0.9705 -0.16 0.6639 
Auditor reputation 0.34 0.4355 0.33 0.4545 
Underwriter rank -0.27* 0.0616 -0.24 0.1139 
Positive net income 0.01 0.9885 0.05 0.9007 
Prior industry 
experience -13.32 0.9845 -13.69 0.9841 
Founder-leave   -0.69 0.2172 
Founder-top   -0.82* 0.0968 
Founder-board   -0.90** 0.0484 
Chi2 Statistic 7.0629 0.4224 12.5542 0.2497 





Table 7. Robustness Test Results for IPO Valuation 
This table presents the impacts of founder transition on IPO valuation by testing subsamples. There are 108 
firms in the sample from 2000-05 and 102 from 2006-12. We calculate Ln (valuation) by computing a natural 
log of the raised capital amount, which is number of shares multiplied by offering price. The founder-leave 
variable is a dummy variable, where “1” denotes that the firm is managed by a non-founder-CEO and that the 
founder is no longer associated with the firm in any way. We identify the founder-top variable as a 
dichotomous measure, where “1” means that the original founder-CEO stays in the firm and assumes a 
non-CEO position in the top management team. The founder-board variable is a dummy variable, where “1” 
indicates that the former founder-CEO stays with the firm and becomes a member of the board, but is not in 
the top management team and is no longer a CEO. We measure NASDAQ 30-days return as a percentage 
return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 days prior to the IPO. Ln (employees) is a measure of firm size 
found by calculating the natural log of the number of employees at the time of IPO. Auditor reputation is a 
dichotomous variable, where “1” shows that the auditing firm is one of the Big 4; otherwise, “0” is used. 
Underwriters are ranked from 0 to 9 by prestige values. Net positive income is a dummy variable and a 
measure of profitability, where “1” indicates a firm that reports a net profit in the year before the IPO; 
otherwise, the value is “0”. Prior industry experience is a dichotomous variable of CEOs, where “1” represents 
that the CEO has management experience in other firms in the same industry as the IPO firm; otherwise, the 
value is “0”. In addition, we include a dummy variable that identifies recessionary periods (i.e. March 2001- 
November 2001 and December 2007 - June 2009) based on the definition provided by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (2007) (Report entitled, “Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions”, 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html) and on data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdpchg.xls). The symbols *, ** and, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Robustness Test 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Ln (Valuation) 
Sample 2000-2005 Sample 2006-2012 
Parameter Estimate P Value Parameter Estimate P Value 
Intercept 15.75*** 0.0001 14.93*** 0.0001 
Firm age -0.01* 0.0963 -0.02* 0.0725 
NASDAQ 30-day return 1.22* 0.0620 -2.58* 0.0908 
Ln (employees) 0.37*** 0.0064 0.50*** 0.0019 
Auditor reputation -0.05 0.7293 0.15 0.5238 
Underwriter rank 0.19*** 0.0001 0.27*** 0.0001 
Positive net income 0.27* 0.0564 0.15 0.3601 
Prior industry experience -0.13 0.6933 -0.09 0.6284 
Recession period -0.20 0.5295 -0.22 0.3787 
Founder-leave 0.21 0.3867 0.30 0.2015 
Founder-top 0.30* 0.0935 -0.23 0.4333 
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Robustness Test 
Founder-board 0.24 0.15573 -0.36 0.1891 
Adjusted R2 0.2902  0.4031  
F Value 4.98*** 0.0001 7.82*** 0.0001 





Table 8. Robustness Test Results for IPO Firm Delisting 
This table presents the impacts of founder transition on IPO firms being delisted, by testing subsamples. There 
are 108 firms in the sample from 2000-05 and 102 from 2006-12. Delisting is a dummy variable that equals 
“1” if a firm is delisted for failing to achieve SEC or stock exchange requirements or being acquired by another 
firm at a price which is 75% or more below its IPO valuation; otherwise, it equals “0”. The founder-leave 
variable is a dummy variable, where “1” denotes that the firm is managed by a non-founder-CEO and that the 
founder is no longer associated with the firm in any way. We identify the founder-top variable as a 
dichotomous measure, where “1” means that the original founder-CEO stays in the firm and assumes a 
non-CEO position in the top management team. The founder-board variable is a dummy variable, where “1” 
indicates that the former founder-CEO stays with the firm and becomes a member of the board, but is not in 
the top management team and is no longer a CEO. We measure NASDAQ 30-days return as a percentage 
return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 days prior to the IPO. Ln (employees) is a measure of firm size 
discovered by calculating the natural log of the number of employees at the time of IPO. Auditor reputation is 
a dichotomous variable, where “1” indicates that the auditing firm is one of the Big 4; otherwise, “0” is used. 
Underwriters are ranked from 0 to 9 by prestige values. Net positive income is a dummy variable and a 
measure of profitability, where “1” indicates a firm that reports a net profit in the year before the IPO; 
otherwise, the value is “0”. Prior industry experience is a dichotomous variable for CEOs, where “1” means 
that the CEO has management experience in other firms in the same industry as the IPO firm; otherwise, the 
value is “0”. In addition, we include a dummy variable that identifies recessionary periods (i.e. March 
2001- November 2001 and December 2007 - June 2009) based on the definition provided by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (2007) (Report entitled, “Business Cycle Expansions and 
Contractions”, https://web.archive.org/web/20071012231548/http://www.nber.org/cycles.html) and on 
data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdpchg.xls). The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Robustness Test 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Delisting 
Sample 2000-05 Sample 2006-12 
Parameter Estimate P Value Parameter Estimate P Value 
Intercept 11.71 0.9830 -1.23 0.5378 
Firm age 0.14 0.1447 0.10 0.1094 
NASDAQ 30-day 
return -3.24 0.4573 -3.50 0.6213 
Ln (employees) -2.25** 0.0479 -0.71 0.3435 
Auditor reputation 0.68 0.5200 -3.44* 0.0870 
Underwriter rank 0.59 0.1003 1.06*** 0.0097 
Positive net income 2.54* 0.0658 0.11 0.8868 
Prior industry 
experience -9.22 0.9866 -11.09 0.9723 
Recession period 9,79 0.9831 -0.69 0.4417 
Founder-leave -2.23 0.2139 -2.80*** 0.0095 
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Robustness Test 
Founder-top -1.97* 0.0951 -1.46 0.2278 
Founder-board 10.99 0.9568 -1.81 0.1750 
Chi2 Statistic 20.4371** 0.0397 26.3799*** 0.0033 
Pseudo R2 0.3583  0.3233  
Number of 
Observation 




Table 9. Robustness Test Results for IPO Firm Litigation 
This table presents the impacts of founder transition on IPO firm litigation by testing subsamples: sample 
2000-05 vs. sample 2006-12. There are 108 firms in sample 2000-05 and 102 in sample 2006-12. The variable 
litigation is “1” if the firm faces a securities class action lawsuit under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act 
within three years of their IPO; otherwise, it is “0”. The founder-leave variable is a dummy variable, where “1” 
denotes that the firm is managed by a non-founder-CEO and that the founder is no longer associated with the 
firm in any way. I identified the founder-top variable as a dichotomous measure, where “1” means that the 
original founder-CEO stays in the firm and assumes a non-CEO position in the top management team. The 
founder-board variable is a dummy variable, where “1” indicates that the former founder-CEO stays with the 
firm and becomes a member of the board, but is not in the top management team and is no longer a CEO. We 
measure NASDAQ 30-days return as a percentage return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 days prior to 
the IPO. Ln (employees) is a measure of firm size inferred by calculating the natural log of the number of 
employees at the time of IPO. Auditor reputation is a dichotomous variable, where “1” demonstrates that the 
auditing firm is one of the Big 4, while “0” was used for non-Big 4 companies. Underwriters are ranked from 0 
to 9 by prestige values. Net positive income is a dummy variable and a measure of profitability, where “1” 
indicates a firm that reports a net profit in the year before the IPO; otherwise, the value is “0”. Prior industry 
experience is a dichotomous CEO variable, where “1” represents that the CEO has management experience in 
other firms in the same industry as the IPO firm; otherwise, the value is “0”. In addition, we include a 
dummy variable that identifies recessionary periods (i.e. March 2001- November 2001 and December 
2007 - June 2009) based on the definition provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(2007) (Report entitled, “Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions”, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20071012231548/http://www.nber.org/cycles.html) and on data provided 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdpchg.xls). The symbols *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Robustness Test 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Litigation 
Sample 2000-2005 Sample 2006-2012 
Parameter Estimate P Value Parameter Estimate P Value 
Intercept 20.65 0.9525 2.23 0.1569 
Firm age 0.01 0.8305 -0.02 0.5932 
NASDAQ 30-day 
return -2.09 0.4337 0.16 0.9730 
Ln (employees) -0.49 0.4207 -0.24 0.6201 
Auditor reputation 0.71 0.2640 -0.30 0.6943 
Underwriter rank -0.69** 0.0407 0.09 0.6822 
Positive net income 0.65 0.3087 -0.44 0.049 
Prior industry 
experience -12.58 0.9711 -14.03 0.9872 
Recession period -0.38 0.7668 0.14 0.8609 
Founder-leave 0.63 0.6257 -0.62 0.3676 
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Robustness Test 
Founder-top -1.42** 0.0404 0.92 0.4401 
Founder-board -1.04* 0.1024 -0.58 0.4705 
Chi2 Statistic 20.9350** 0.0341 4.8017 0.9040 
Pseudo R2 0.1917  0.0476  
Number of 
Observation 
108  102  
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Table 10. Regression Results for IPO Firm Litigation (Non-Accounting-Related Fraud Vs. 
Accounting-Related Fraud) 
This table presents the impacts of founder transition on IPO firm litigation by testing subsamples: sample 
non-accounting-related fraud vs. sample accounting-related fraud. Among all 42 lawsuits, there are 20 
accounting allegations and 22 non-accounting allegations, and we use 20 out of 188 firms to run the logistic 
regression on accounting-related allegations, and 22 out of 190 firms to run the logistic regression on 
non-accounting allegations. The variable litigation is “1” if the firm faces a securities class action lawsuit 
under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act within three years of their IPO; otherwise, it is “0”. The 
founder-leave variable is a dummy variable, where “1” denotes that the firm is managed by a 
non-founder-CEO and that the founder is no longer associated with the firm in any way. We identify the 
founder-top variable as a dichotomous measure, where “1” means that the original founder-CEO stays in the 
firm and assumes a non-CEO position in the top management team. The founder-board variable is a dummy 
variable, where “1” indicates that the former founder-CEO stays with the firm and becomes a member of the 
board, but is not in the top management team and is no longer a CEO. We measure NASDAQ 30-days return 
as a percentage return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 days prior to the IPO. Ln (employees) is a measure 
of firm size determined by calculating the natural log of the number of employees at the time of IPO. Auditor 
reputation is a dichotomous variable, where “1” denotes that the auditing firm is one of the Big 4 audit firms; 
otherwise, “0” is used. Underwriters are ranked from 0 to 9 by prestige values. Net positive income is a 
dummy variable and a measure of profitability, where “1” indicates a firm that reports a net profit in the year 
before the IPO; otherwise, the value is “0”. Prior industry experience is a dichotomous variable regarding 
CEOs, where “1” indicates that the CEO has management experience in other firms in the same industry as the 
IPO firm; otherwise, the value is “0”. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. 
Robustness Test 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Litigation 
Non-Accounting-Related Lawsuits Accounting-Related Lawsuits 
Parameter Estimate P Value Parameter Estimate P Value 
Intercept 15.84 0.9761 18.29 0.9704 
Firm age 0.03 0.4094 -0.01 0.7572 
NASDAQ 30-day 
return -6.68** 0.0463 3.16 0.2659 
Ln (employees) -0.21 0.6688 -0.03 0.9447 
Auditor reputation 0.09 0.8768 0.37 0.5408 
Underwriter rank -0.10 0.5742 -0.42 0.1196 
Positive net income 0.03 0.9313 -0.03 0.9558 
Prior industry 
experience -12.16 0.9817 -12.32 0.9800 
Founder-leave -0.93 0.1797 -0.33 0.7024 
Founder-top -1.40** 0.0152 0.74 0.4983 
Founder-board 0.28 0.7322 -1.49*** 0.0081 
  40	
 
Chi2 Statistic 15.5833 0.1122 16.8664* 0.0774 
Pseudo R2 0.1144  0.1324  
Number of 
Observation 






























Table 11. Regression Results for IPO Firm Litigation (Non-Laddering Lawsuits) 
This table presents the impacts of founder transition on IPO firm litigation by testing the subsample: 
non-laddering lawsuits. Among all 42 lawsuits, there are 11 laddering and 31 non-laddering lawsuits; we use 
31 out of 199 firms to run the logistic regression. The variable litigation is “1” if the firm faces a securities 
class action lawsuit under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act within three years of their IPO; otherwise, it is 
“0”. The founder-leave variable is a dummy variable, where “1” denotes that the firm is managed by a 
non-founder-CEO and that the founder is no longer associated with the firm in any way. We identify the 
founder-top variable as a dichotomous measure, where “1” means that the original founder-CEO stays in the 
firm and assumes a non-CEO position in the top management team. The founder-board variable is a dummy 
variable, where “1” indicates that the former founder-CEO stays with the firm and becomes a member of the 
board, but is not in the top management team and is no longer a CEO. We measure NASDAQ 30-days return 
as a percentage return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 days prior to the IPO. Ln (employees) is a measure 
of firm size reached by calculating the natural log of the number of employees at the time of IPO. Auditor 
reputation is a dichotomous variable, where “1” denotes that the auditing firm is one of the Big 4 firms; 
otherwise, “0” is used. Underwriters are ranked from 0 to 9 by prestige values. Net positive income is a 
dummy variable and a measure of profitability, where “1” indicates a firm that reports a net profit in the year 
before the IPO; otherwise, the value is “0”. Prior industry experience is a dichotomous variable for CEOs, 
where “1” demonstrates that the CEO has management experience in other firms in the same industry as the 
IPO firm; otherwise, the value is “0”. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. 
Robustness Test 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Litigation 
Non-Laddering Lawsuits 
Parameter Estimate P Value 
Intercept 17.17 0.9708 
Firm age 0.00 0.9986 
NASDAQ 30-day return 1.31 0.5781 
Ln (employees) -0.26 0.5016 
Auditor reputation 0.01 0.9790 
Underwriter rank -0.21 0.2423 
Positive net income -0.29 0.4935 
Prior industry experience -12.73 0.9784 
Founder-leave -0.59 0.3254 
Founder-top -0.62 0.4382 
Founder-board -0.84* 0.0846 
Chi2 Statistic 11.3309 0.3323 
Pseudo R2 0.0658  
N=199 
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Table 12. Regression Results for IPO Firm Litigation (Non-Dismissed Cases Vs. Dismissed 
Cases) 
This table presents the impacts of founder transition on IPO firm litigation by testing the subsamples: sample 
non-dismissed cases vs. sample non-dismissed cases. Among all 42 cases, 13 were dismissed, 24 were settled, 
and 5 are still pending. We run subsample tests using 13 out of 181 firms to run the logistic regression on 
dismissed cases, and 29 out of 197 firms to run the logistic regression on non-dismissed cases. The variable 
litigation is “1” if the firm faces a securities class action lawsuit under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act 
within three years of their IPO; otherwise, it is “0”. The founder-leave variable is a dummy variable, where “1” 
denotes that the firm is managed by a non-founder-CEO and that the founder is no longer associated with the 
firm in any way. I identified the founder-top variable as a dichotomous measure, where “1” means that the 
original founder-CEO stays in the firm and assumes a non-CEO position in the top management team. The 
founder-board variable is a dummy variable, where “1” indicates that the former founder-CEO stays with the 
firm and becomes a member of the board, but is not in the top management team and is no longer a CEO. We 
measure NASDAQ 30-days return as a percentage return on the NASDAQ index during the 30 days prior to 
the IPO. Ln (employees) is a measure of firm size garnered by calculating the natural log of the number of 
employees at the time of IPO. Auditor reputation is a dichotomous variable, where “1” tells us that the auditing 
firm is one of the Big 4; otherwise, “0” is used. Underwriters are ranked from 0 to 9 by prestige values. Net 
positive income is a dummy variable and a measure of profitability, where “1” indicates a firm that reports a 
net profit in the year before the IPO; otherwise, the value is “0”. Prior industry experience is a dichotomous 
variable of CEOs, where “1” denotes that the CEO has management experience in other firms in the same 
industry as the IPO firm; otherwise, the value is “0”. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Robustness Test 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Litigation 
Non-Dismissed Cases Dismissed Cases 
Parameter Estimate P Value Parameter Estimate P Value 
Intercept 15.51 0.9737 19.52 0.9751 
Firm age 0.03 0.3245 -0.01 0.6983 
NASDAQ 30-day 
return -1.84 0.4645 -0.35 0.9253 
Ln (employees) -0.08 0.8456 -0.45 0.4625 
Auditor reputation 0.52 0.2894 -0.07 0.9405 
Underwriter rank -0.26 0.1302 -0.14 0.6171 
Positive net income 0.32 0.4624 -0.61 0.3552 
Prior industry 
experience -12.00 0.9796 -13.07 0.9833 
Founder-leave -0.53 0.4161 -1.16 0.2399 
Founder-top -0.91* 0.0845 0.11 0.9268 
Founder-board -0.16 0.7802 -2.19*** 0.0049 
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Robustness Test 
Chi2 Statistic 10.9486 0.3615 14.7109 0.1430 
Pseudo R2 0.0665  0.1573  
Number of 
Observation 
197  181  
 
